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International Humanitarian Assistance:
The Role of the Red Cross
David P. Forsythe*
Increasingly in wars and other public disorders, the latter being
sometimes called complex emergencies, more civilians suffer than
combatants.1 Particularly in the post-cold war world, one could
identify a zone of turmoil marked by acute civilian suffering. Out of
the zone of turmoil emerged a zone of tranquility which operated a
complicated system of humanitarian assistance to respond to civilian
suffering.2 Media coverage emphasized the suffering, but never before
in world history had such a kaleidoscope of humanitarian actors
combined to provide emergency relief on such a broad scale. There
were governmental actors (e.g., USAID and its OFDA),
intergovernmental actors (e.g., ECHO, UNHCR, UNICEF, World
Food Program), and non-governmental organizations (e.g.,CARE,
Oxfam, World Vision, Save the Children Federation).3 Inevitably,
" Professor of Political Science
INTERNATIONAL REvIEw OF THE RED CROSS, No. 282, May-June 1991,at 308
(according to Red Cross sources, civilians made us 15% of victims during World War
I, 65% in World War I, and 90% in armed conflicts today). WORLD DISASTERS
REPORT 34 (1994) ("Complex emergencies" is an amorphous term used at the U.N.
to by-pass argument over the dividing line between wars or armed conflicts and
broader situations. It implies at a minimum breakdown of national order, human
suffering, and lack of control by any one actor).
2 MAX SINGER & AARON WILDAVSKY, THE REAL WORLD ORDER: ZONES OF PEACE,
ZONES OF TURMOm (1993); Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, THE ATLANTC
MONTHLY, Feb. 1994, at 44-76; LARRY MINEAR AND THOMAS G. WEISS, MERCY
UNDERFRE: WAR AND THE GLOBALHUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY (1995); Andrew S.
Natsios, NGOs and the UN System in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies, in
NGOs, THE UN, & GLOBAL GovERNANCE (Thomas G. Weiss & Leon Gordenker eds.,
1996); A FRAMEWORK FOR SURVIVAL: HEALTH, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE IN CONFLICTS AND DISASTERS (Kevin M. Cahill ed., 1993).
HUMANITARIANISM ACROSS BORDERS (Thomas G. Weiss & Larry Minear eds.,
1993).
' The U.S. Agency for International Development and its Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance, along with the European Union and its agency that went under the name
of European Community Humanitarian Office, were major donors in the system of
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calls were heard for better organization and coordination, and in 1992
the United Nations created a Department of Humanitarian Affairs.
The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement has been
concerned with war-related suffering ever since its origins in the
middle of the 19th century. While the early focus of the original Red
Cross agency, what is now called the International Committee of the
Red Cross [hereinafter "ICRC"], was on wounded combatants,
attention eventually included civilians in war zones. The Red Cross
and Red Crescent Movement, theoretically coordinated by the ICRC
in wars and similar disorders, is officially a private or quasi-private
network. The ICRC in particular prides itself on its independence. It
is historically unique and has a special place in international
humanitarian law.' The ICRC, in principle all Swiss, wishes to be
neither the humanitarian arm of the United Nations Security Council
nor the humanitarian showcase of the Swiss state, with which it has a
special relationship.5
What then is the current role and future prospects for the Red
Cross in international humanitarian assistance? Will it continue to
carve out a unique and useful role? Or will it be marginalized by such
developments as improved United Nations coordination and/or greater
humanitarian assistance.
4 David P. Forsythe, The Red Cross as Transnational Movement, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION, Fall (1976); David P. Forsythe, HuMANITARIAN POLITICS: THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMr-FrEE OF THE RED CROSS (1977); David P. Forsythe, Choices
More Ethical than Legal: The International Committee of the Red Cross and Human
Rights, 7 ETics & INT'L AFFAIRS, 131-151 (1993); David P. Forsythe, Hunan
Rights and the International Committee of the Red Cross, 12 HUM.RTs Q. 265-289
(1990); ISABELLE VICHNIAC, CROIX-ROUGE, LES STRATEGES DE LA BONNE
CONSCIENCE (1988); JOHN F. HUTCHINSON, CHAMPIONS OF CHARITY: WAR AND THE
RISE OFTHE RED CROSS (1996). There is an entire library of publications put out by
Red Cross and Red Crescent agencies themselves.
I FRANCOIS BUGNION, LE COMITE INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX-ROUGE ET LA
PROTECTION DES VICTIMES DE LA GUERRE 1994 (the ICRC tried to enhance it
independence from the Swiss state during the 1990s, or at least to give the appearance
of greater independence, through a new legal agreement); see Christian Dominice,
L 'Accord de Siege conclue par le Comite International de la Croix-Rouge avec la
Suisse, REvUE GENERAL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, Jan.-Apr. 1994, at 5-36.
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effectiveness by other relief agencies? Evaluation of the ICRC, as
with other relief agencies, requires attention to five tasks: 1)
negotiating access to civilians in need; 2) assessing human need; 3)
mobilizing resources; 4) delivering assistance; 5) evaluating
performance and planning for the future.6
I. BACKGROUND
The ICRC claims a special role in international humanitarian
assistance because of history, international humanitarian law, and Red
Cross principles. The organization has played a major role in assisting
war victims from 1859 on, at a time when the French army had more
veterinarians to care for horses than doctors to care for soldiers.7 It
successfully lobbied for the first Geneva Convention for war victims
in 1864, and thereafter played a role in the subsequent development
of international humanitarian law. In the current codification of that
law, the ICRC is specifically mentioned and is given certain rights and
duties-to visit prisoners of war and civilian detainees in international
armed conflict. Red Cross principles require it to act for humanity, on
a universal basis, with impartiality and neutrality--and independence--
inter alia.8
There is a recognized right to humanitarian assistance for
civilians in occupied territory as a result of international armed
conflict. Although this right is nowhere explicitly stated, one can read
international humanitarian law to mean that in on-going international
armed conflict, there is an implied right to humanitarian assistance. A
belligerent may have only the right to control the means of delivery
but not to block the delivery itself This implied right to humanitarian
assistance is stipulated in several sources. In non-international armed
conflict, at least in the Geneva Conventions (Common Article 3) and
6 MiNEAR & WEISS, supra note 2.
7 BUGNION, supra note 5.
s See Jacques Moreillon, Du bon usage de quelques Principlesfondamentaux de la
Croix-Rouge, in STuDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND
RED CROSS PRINCIPLES 913-923 (Christopher Swinarski ed., 1984).
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Protocol II, there is an implied right to humanitarian assistance. The
U.N. Security Council has declared that to interfere with humanitarian
assistance constitutes a war crime, without drawing a distinction
between international and internal conflict. The 1995 Red Cross
Conference, meeting in Geneva, asserted a general right to
humanitarian assistance in all armed conflict. The U.N. General
Assembly has passed resolutions on humanitarian assistance which
say, on the one hand, that "countries" can request assistance, implying
that non-governmental parties can make the request, but, on the other
hand, stating that assistance shall occur with the consent of the state,
implying a negation of a human right to assistance.9
However, if the situation of concern is a complex emergency
or some type of disorder not widely viewed as armed conflict,
international humanitarian law does not legally apply. One must turn
to general human rights law as found, for example, in the U.N.
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, where one reads
of personal rights to adequate food, clothing, shelter, health care, etc.
But the convention implies that the state has the duty to provide what
is legally required, and there is no mention of third parties, or outside
parties, in the provision of assistance. Although there is a monitoring
mechanism to supervise the application of the Covenant, this
committee of experts is not an operational relief agency.
In so far as an actor believes that there is a right to
humanitarian assistance in public international law, the ICRC is given
no monopoly on its delivery. The ICRC is mentioned in the Geneva
Conventions and Protocols as an example of the type of impartial,
humanitarian agency that could be involved. Where one finds an
" See also David P. Forsythe, Human Rights andHumanitarian Assistance: Some
Theoretical Observations, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
OPERATIONS, (Nitza Nachmias & Eric Belgrad eds., forthcoming); George Kent, The
US. and Humanitarian Assistance (forthcoming 1996) (paper prepared fro the 15th
Hemdricks symposium). BIGNION, supra note 5. PETER MACALISTER-SMITH,
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, no. 284, PROTECTION OF THE CIVILIAN
POPULATION AND THE PROHIBITION OF STARVATION AS A METHOD OF WARFARE, Sept.-
Oct., 1991, at 440-457.
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international or internal armed conflict, or even a similar complex
emergency, one usually finds the ICRC presenting its services to the
fighting parties for assistance and prisoner matters. Thus, the ICRC
has a traditional role in such situations. The ICRC has been involved
in the major examples of armed conflict and civilian suffering after the
cold war, as in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, etc., and in legally more
ambiguous situations as in Chechnyna.
A different point deserves emphasis. Whatever the law and
tradition, many fighting parties in the post-cold war world have never
heard of the Geneva Conventions, and/or have never heard of the
ICRC, and/or simply regard civilian suffering and humanitarian
assistance as weapons in their political struggles. As was said of
Somalia in 1992, "Virtually no one with a weapon had heard of the
Geneva Conventions .... 10 The ICRC and other relief agencies face
illiterate child-soldiers on drugs, brutal war lords interested only in
personal power, military commanders who think nothing about
massacres or starvation of civilians and deadly attacks on relief
workers and their convoys, and political leaders more interested in
state sovereignty than the welfare of persons. ICRC delegates and
other relief workers have been killed, and other ICRC delegates have
witnessed such horrors in places like Liberia that they require
psychiatric counseling.1 Particularly large scale relief requires the
cooperation of those with the guns on the ground, whatever diplomats
and lawyers might say about a right to humanitarian assistance. The
only alternative to negotiated cooperation is to overwhelm with
military force, which is not a viable option in most situations owing to
lack of political will, as well as moral opposition, by important parts
of the international community. 2
30 Jennifer Leaning, When the System Doesn't Work: Somalia 1992, in CAHmL, supra
note 2, at 112.
1 INrERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, EMERGENCY APPEALS 22 (1995).
32 See especially Adam Roberts, Humanitarian War. Military Intervention and
Human Rights, IT'LAFF. 429-450 (1993)(stating even in Somalia during the winter
of 1992-1993, the deployment of military force was not initially directed against
various political leaders but against bandits and thugs. Somali "war lords" had quietly
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II. NEGOTIATION ACCESS
In Geneva, the ICRC has a staff of about 600 that tracks the
plight of civilians in war and complex emergencies, along with its
other concerns. In the 1990s, the ICRC sent out an additional 600
persons organized into regional and sub-regional delegations to work
in the field. In addition to its exisiting involvements, it planned over
20 sizable assistance programs costing about $500 million in 1995.'"
Unfortunately, many national Red Cross or Red Crescent
societies in the poorer states are too weak to provide much support
to the ICRC. But the local affiliate is in a good position to provide
information about the situation, or has good contacts with a fighting
party. The ICRC has increased their effort to stay in touch with
national affiliates, but not always with the support of their association,
the Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, which has a
separate headquarters in Geneva.
Since the ICRC has observer status at the United Nations, it
comes in direct contact with governments. The head of the ICRC's
New York office meets monthly with the president of the U.N.
Security Council. The ICRC participates in two consultative
groupings in New York and Geneva with NGOs involved in relief In
1995, the ICRC opened an office in Washington D.C.. The ICRC
seems reasonably informed about where it should seek access to
civilians in need.
The ICRC's maximum objective is to engage in both relief
action and detention visits on all sides of a conflict. With regard to
relief; the ICRC asks for: freedom of movement to make assessments,
the right to monitor relief to ensure impartiality, administrative control
over the delivery system, and the right to make follow-up inquiries
agreed to the military deployment. Likewise in the former Yugoslavia, while NATO
in the form of IFOR had the military power to carry out enforcement operations, it was
deployed with the agreement of the parties who signed the Dayton and Paris Accords.
There is considerable moral as well as political opposition to "humanitarian war"
which would force assistance on resisting political leaders).
'" International Committee of the Red Cross, APPEL SIEGE 1995, (1994).
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about the impact of relief. 4 However, given the lack of humanitarian
commitment by various fighting parties and the presence of other
relief actors to which the fighting parties can turn, achieving principled
access is a delicate diplomatic art form.
There is a widespread belief that when the ICRC negotiates for
access it is rigid and unbending, emphasizing the rules of humanitarian
law and also Red Cross principles. The president of the International
Council of Doctors Without Borders believes that the ICRC never
tries to deliver humanitarian assistance without consent because of its
links to international law."5 That group developed because of a belief
that adequate relief had not gotten to Biafra during the Nigerian civil
war, in part because the ICRC was too concerned about agreement
from the Federal side. A relief expert sees the ICRC's commitment to
Red Cross principles as "inviolate."1 6 A superficial examination of
events would seem to support this view.
In certain situations, the ICRC believed that the delivery of
relief must meet certain international standards. It prefers to suspend
its operations or withdraw from a situation rather than violate those
standards. During the Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970, the federal
air force shot down a plane trying to deliver Red Cross relief from
Lagos to the Biafran enclave without permission. The ICRC
suspended operations and decided that the federal side did indeed have
the right to supervise assistance, from federal territory if necessary,
reasoning by analogy to Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
of 12 August 1949.' 7 If Biafran authorities would not agree to
" Marion Harroff-Tavel, Action Taken by the International Committee of the Red
Cross in Situations of Internal Violence, INT'L REV. RED CROSS, no. 294 June 1993,
at 215.
Montieth Illingworth, Remedies for an Ailing World: An Interview with Doris
Schopper, HEMIsPHEREs, June 1995, at 19-24.
16 NATsIOs, supra note 2.
17 THIERRY HENTSCH, FACE AU BLOCUS: LA CROIX-ROUGE INTERNATIONALE DANS LE
NIGERIA EN GUERRE 1967-1970 (1973). The ICRC had obtained a "fly at your own
risk" permission from Lagos. After that permission was revoked, the ICRC continued
to participate in "night" flights, in which Red Cross planes mixed in with planes
carrying armaments to Biafran forces. This airlift was thus not a purely neutral
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reasonable federal plans for relief, the ICRC would have to retire to
the sidelines.
In Old Greater Ethiopia in 1988, the ICRC withdrew from an
assistance role because it found the relief plans of the central
government to be both harsh and unacceptably political. The
Mengistu government was using international relief to lure civilians
into relocation projects, so as to remove civilians from areas of
guerrilla or rebel uprisings. In the process some families were divided.
Although other relief agencies were willing to participate in this
scheme, the ICRC withdrew because it failed to achieve detention
visits to prisoners held by the central government. To ICRC's
consternation, the Red Cross Federation then filled the assistance role
on governmental terms just rejected by the ICRC.
In the former Yugoslavia, during the early 1990s, the ICRC
managed a relief operation second in size and importance only to the
U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR]. In
that conflict, some observers found the ICRC more principled than the
UNHCR18 In their view, the ICRC was more likely to suspend relief
deliveries, even if it meant civilian hardship, because of considerations
of impartiality and neutrality, by comparison to the UNHCR. The
UNHCR seemed more tolerant of political diversions and objectives
than the ICRC although both agencies acted primarily for civilians. In
Bosnia, the ICRC and the UNHCR, alike in many ways, sometimes
differed on what constituted adequate humanitarian space in the midst
of war.
Likewise, in the Sudan for many years, the ICRC refused to
provide relief schemes for the south of that troubled country unless
the government assured that there would be no diversions to military
operation. But the ICRC was concerned about civilians in the Biafran enclave, and
was competing with Joint Church Aid, a coalition of relief actors not much interested
in the niceties of state consent or impartiality. Had the ICRC withdrawn earlier, it
would have left assistance in war to JCA, and would have lost the support of much
public opinion in Europe and North America which was pro-Biafran.
'8 MInEAR & WEISS, supra note 2; LARRY MINEAR, ET AL., HuMANITARIAN ACTION
niE ar FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: Ti-r U.N. 's ROLE 1991-1993 43,78 (1994).
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parties. While this meant that at times relief was not provided to any
civilians, it was also true that certain satisfactory agreements were
struck for limited times and effects. 9
ICRC officials reinforced the image of great attention to rules
and principles, saying that the ICRC cannot ignore international
humanitarian law, with its attention to state consent, since the ICRC
helped develop that law. Overall, the picture of the ICRC and
humanitarian assistance is quite complex.
The ICRC acted in a fairly "revolutionary" way for a time in
the Nigerian civil war. It delivered relief in a manner that contributed
to some Biafran political objectives, offending various parties on the
federal side, while knowingly contravened the wishes of the Ethiopian
central government. From 1976 the ICRC participated in a "cross
border" relief operation from the Sudan. It delivered assistance to
Tigray and Eritrea, then in rebellion. The ICRC also seeked Tigrayan
permission to visit Ethiopian fighters detained by the rebel movement.
In this context, the ICRC even removed the Red Cross symbol from
its trucks to avoid Ethiopian air attacks on relief convoys. In May
1987 the ICRC withdrew from the crossborder effort, saying that
emergency civilian need in Tigray had abated when in fact the
attempted detention visits never took place. In any event, from the
Ethiopian point bf view, the ICRC "crashed the gate" in Tigray,.2"
Debate continues in Geneva over whether this type of "revolutionary"
action would be repeated or was a one time, exceptional event. Thus,
overall policy is not clear.
In a number of situations, the ICRC would inform a
government that it was delivering relief, but Geneva would not ask for
'9 See RAKIYA OMAAR & ALEX DE WAAL, HUMANITARIANISM UNBOUND: CURRENT
DmEmmAS FACING MuLTI-MANDATE RELIEF OPERATIONS IN POLITICAL EMERGENCIES
14(1994); LARRY MINEAR, HUMANITARIANISM UNDER SIEGE: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF
OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN (1991); FRANCIS M. DENG & LARRY MINEAR, THE
CHALLENGES OF FAMINE RELIEF: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE SUDAN (1992).
20 BUGNION, supra note 5.
" See also William De Mars, Contending Neutralities: Humanitarian Organizations
and War in the Horn ofAfrica, in SOLIDARITY BEYOND THE STATE: THE DYNAMICS
OF TRANSNATiONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Charles Chatfield et al. eds., 1996).
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consent or permission. This occurred in Afghanistan during the 1980s
when it operated from Pakistan. A rather remarkable version of this
type of action occurred in Cambodia after the Vietnamese invasion of
1979. Finding needy civilians in the hinterland, the ICRC and
UNICEF engaged in a cross border operation from Thailand. When
the government in Phnom Phen objected, the ICRC and UNICEF
continued. They asserted a duty to help civilians in need, knowing
that the Cambodian government lacked the means to implement its
objections. Eventually, the government accepted the realities of
international relief. 22
The ICRC had previously engaged in cross border assistance
on a small scale to Iraqi Kurds. There it operated from Iran before the
fall of the Shah. In that case, while the ICRC has been reticent, it is
unlikely that notification was given to Saddam Hussein of help to his
ethnic, domestic enemies. 2 In places like Liberia, without effective
central government, requesting consent was out of the question. The
ICRC, like other relief agencies, did what it could, trying to secure the
cooperation of local para-military forces.
In Somalia during the early 1990s, the ICRC continued relief,
even when other agencies pulled out, despite the loss of some 5%
(1993) to 20% (1992) of the relief to political and other disruptions.
The ICRC hired its own local protection force made up of armed
individuals, and paid them in rice, in order to get some relief to
hundred of thousands of starving civilians. After the U.N. authorized
military force to secure humanitarian assistance, the ICRC cooperated
with that sizable military presence. The ICRC worked at the end of
a logistics system with the Somali Red Crescent, dominated by the
U.S. military. From one view this was a militarized relief system that
was nevertheless intended to be impartial, in that it was supposed to
benefit civilians without regard to political orientation, gender,
ethnicity, clan, or other identification. The ICRC later argued that the
military should stay out of assistance, leaving it to the impartial, non-
22 BUGNION, supra note 5.
2' CHRISTOPHE GIROD, TEMPETE SUR LE DESERT: LE COMITE INTERNATIONAL DE LA
CROIX-ROUGE ET LA GUERRE DU GOLFE 1990-1991 28 (1994).
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governmental agencies, but in Somalia the ICRC cooperated with
military forces and local armed groups to save civilian lives.2 4
What do these examples tell us about the ICRC and
negotiating access for humanitarian assistance? Independence,
impartiality, neutrality, and other norms of interest to the ICRC do not
implement themselves in war and complex emergency. The
proliferation of relief actors whether governmental, inter-
governmental, or non-governmental makes it difficult for the ICRC to
successfully implement its values. The ICRC is interested in both
principled action and doing practical good for civilians in need. It also
has a tradition, at least for small scale operations, of giving delegates
considerable room to maneuver in the field. All of these factors
hamper consistency.
Thus, there is not one, dominant pattern of ICRC access to
civilians for relief The agency clearly prefers a negotiated
arrangement with all parties consistent with legal and Red Cross
norms. But when that optimum situation cannot be achieved, it has
acted in different ways in different situations out of practicality in
context. The ICRC is not so legalistic and/or moralistic as some have
believed, but at the same time it is not just another private relief
agency. Like its spokespersons, it works both sides of the fence. It
emphasizes public international law and Red Cross principles (which
are approved by Red Cross Conferences in which states are
represented), but it has acted against the wishes of some public
authorities on occasion for the welfare of civilians in dire straights.
Also, it acted in gray areas where it is unclear whether explicit consent
has been obtained.
III. ASSESSMENT OF NEED
The same system in place to identify civilians in need operates
to assess that need. Governments, intergovernmental organizations,
24 In the former Yugoslavia, at approximately the same time, the ICRC accepted
military protection to guarantee prisoner release and exchange, but not for civilian
relief.
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NGOs, the communications media, and the Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement can all become involved. From 1992, the U.N.
created an Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, who
doubled as the Emergency Relief Coordinator, and who was
connected to an embryonic U.N. early warning system with some
assessment capacity. Even state intelligence agencies acted as the
service of assessment.
In most conflicts, there is not a single, coordinated assessment
of humanitarian need. If the conflict attracts enough attention, there
is likely to be a variety of assessments--from the UNHCR concerning
refugees and those in a refugee like situation, from UNICEF
concerning mothers and children, from the WHO concerning health,
perhaps from the U.N. Resident Representative in countries hosting
programs from the U.N. Development Program, and etc. In Somalia
in February of 1992, Africa Watch, then a sub-division of Human
Rights Watch, which normally emphasizes civil and political rights,
sent a survey team along with Physicians for Human Rights to assess
need for assistance in that failed state.25 Despite the fact that the
ICRC, special representative of the U.N. Secretary-General, the U.S.
AID, and many other agencies had already reported assessment from
Somalia. Likewise, in the former Federal Yugoslavia during the early
1990s, there were many assessments of civilian need, including from
the local offices of the former Yugoslav Red Cross.2 6 Many NGOs
have personnel strung across the so-called Third World; they send
reports to their superiors who in turn communicate with the rest of the
fragmented international relief system.
"The ICRC does not accept reports or requests at face value
by outside sources."27 During the spring of 1991, the U.S. and certain
Western states intervened forcibly in Northern Iraq, ostensibly to
protect and assist Iraqi Kurds. Some National Red Cross Societies,
such as the American Red Cross, followed their governments into that
25 Leaning, in Cahill, supra note 2, at 108.
26 MINEAR ET AL., HUMANITARIAN AcTION, supra note 18, at 3 1.
27 ICRC, "The Role of the ICRC in Relief Operations," March, 1994, unpublished
statement, read by permission.
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situation. The ICRC carried out its own surveys of civilian need in
northern Iraq for two reasons. First, it was already present in
Baghdad because of Desert Storm ealier that year. More important,
it was becasue of its interaction with the Iraqi government since 1980.
In this context, the ICRC refused to act on the basis of reports from
intervening governments and their Red Cross societies.
However, self-assessment is not an iron-clad principle. The
ICRC will act on the basis of a report from "a partner of its choice.""2
In Iraq during the mid-1990s, the ICRC used an assessment of civilian
need by the WHO as part of its appeal for funds to carry out a relief
operation.29 WHO's broad survey fits the ICRC's limited data on
segments of the population. The ICRC then lobbied the United
Nations to pay more attention to the plight of the overall Iraqi
population, whose hardship was directly linked to economic sanctions
imposed under U.N. authorization.
The ICRC has specialists to assess civilian needs concerning
health, nutrition, shelter, potable water, etc. In a large regional ICRC
delegation, as found in Nairobi and Kenya, several such specialists are
already in the field. Others can be sent from Geneva on short notice.
However, if the ICRC is excluded from a country, as in Cambodia
under the Khmer Rouge or in Sudan for much of the 1990s, proper
assessment cannot be made.
Usually, the assessments for humanitarian assistance remain
consistent. This may be due to persistent information sharing that
goes on in New York and Geneva among the component actors of the
relief system. Occasionally, the ICRC or another actor will come
across a new segment of persons in need in places like Liberia or
Mozambique. In such case, some actors will proceed to act on the
new information while others will defer to that division of labor. The
ICRC, in trying to draw the U.N. Security Council's attention to the
situation of vulnerable civilians in Iraq, was only one step ahead of
similar concerns by other actors. In similar reports about civilians in
28 Id.
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSs, EMERGENCY APPEL 155 (1995).
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Haiti, during a time of economic sanctions because of military
government, certain other actors seemed a step ahead of the ICRC.
In general, the problem is not accurate assessment but
mobilization of adequate response. Somalia is a good case in point.
A number of actors recognized the prospect of massive starvation by
late 1991 and early 1992. The ICRC, Save the Children Federation
(British division), and by some accounts U.S. AID, projected the
problem accurately enough. The U.N. appointed a special
representative in May of 1992, but it was not until that July that
wheels began to turn for a greater international effort. And it was not
until October of 1992 that the U.N. devised a coordinated
international plan for dealing with starvation in Somalia. It was only
in December of 1992 that military force was authorized and
dispatched to secure the delivery of humanitarian assistance.3"
IV. MOBLIZATION OF RESOURCES
The ICRC is well positioned to mobilize resources for relief,
being part of a transnational movement, having a special role in armed
conflict, and being well known to the major donors such as U.S. AID
and the European Union's ECHO. But the scale of disasters can
exceed ICRC capability, the agency has not always mobilized certain
types of relief, and it has not always proven adept at mobilizing
concern.
Over the past decade, from the mid-1980s, the ICRC
quadrupled its spending for relief to the range of $500-600 million.
The agency also found the necessary personnel to administer its relief
programs. The ICRC can call on personnel from the various Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies since the agency insists on Swiss
nationals only for detention visits. Those who wanted the ICRC to
concentrate on prisoner matters and those who wanted the agency to
limit itself to very small relief operations, have clearly been passed
over by events. But it remains unclear just what is the ceiling on
3 See especially Leaning, in Cahill, supra note 2, at 114, 117.
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ICRC relief capacity.
The exodus of several million persons from Rwanda during
1994, or the projected starvation of hundreds of thousands of Somalis
during 1992 and 1993, was clearly beyond the capacity of the ICRC.
As far back as 1971 and events in eastern Pakistan, soon to be
Bangladesh, the size of the human problem mandated a United
Nations role.' The view is widely held that some relief problems are
so massive that only governments, particularly their militaries, can
respond adequately.32 But ICRC relief operations were not small in
Somalia up through the end of 1991. In both Bosnia and Jordan
during the early 1990s, the ICRC coordinated sizable relief
undertakings.
It is possible that improved coordination of relief appeals via
the United Nations and its Department of Humanitarian Affairs will
preempt the ICRC as mobilizer of significant Red Cross relief This is
not likely to happen anytime soon. Major donors like the U.S. and the
EU's ECHO are not insisting on such a coordinated system of
mobilization because they regard the ICRC as far more efficient than
most U.N. agencies. Some U.N. attempts at coordinated appeals have
proven disappointing.33
Surprisingly enough for an agency that traces its history to
medical assistance to the battlefield wounded in 1859, the ICRC failed
to play a major role in mobilizing medical relief until the 1970s.
Medical relief was left mostly to the national Red Cross and Red
Crescent societies. The Nigerian civil war changed matters, and from
1977 the ICRC coordinated a medical division, and not just a medical
coordinator, in its Geneva structure. With competition from Medecins
3, THOMAS W. OLIVER, THEUNrTED NATIONS IN BANGLADESH (1978) (stating that in
that situation, for a time the U.N. relief coordinator was a Swiss national who was also
a member of the Assembly of the ICRC. It was not always clear whether this
individual was wearing his U.N. hat or his ICRC hat when directing relief in that
South Asian conflict).
32 HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES AND MILITARY HELP IN AFRIcA, (Thomas G. Weiss,
ed., 1990).
33 MINEAR & WEISS, supra note 2, at 118.
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Sans Frontiers [Doctors Without Borders] and other medical groups,
by the mid-1990s, the ICRC expanded its medical work to the point
where approximately 20% of its emergency budget, and some 10% of
its regular budget, was going to medical field work. Some in the
Geneva headquarters thought this activity duplicated or undercut
efforts at the national level.
In any event, the ICRC was slow to recognize the need for
transnational medical relief, a need that was filled in part by other
organizations that mostly had a wider mandate and sometimes a
different approach than the ICRC. Doctors Without Borders did not
limit itself to situations of armed conflict and initially was not much
interested in state consent. Physicians for Human Rights was active
in forensic medicine related to judicial proceedings, whereas the ICRC
theoretically supported punishments for war crimes while refusing to
gather evidence for or testify in such trials--the better to protect its
field work in conflict situations. The ICRC also did not play a
significant role in mobilizing opposition to the participation of medical
personnel in ill-treatment of detainees, leaving that issue to other
private groups. 34
The Red Cross Movement competed with other medical
groups concerning humanitarian assistance around the world. This
competition was especially evident in the poorer countries where few
doctors were available for charitable or pro bono work. Some of the
rougher edges of the competition were moderating by the mid-
1990s. 35 In places like Rwanda during 1994, Medecins Sans Frontiers
personnel worked under ICRC aegis and rules of engagement.
There is some debate as to whether the ICRC mobilizes the
right type of relief Most in the ICRC relief division dismiss the
31 ERIC STOVER, THE OPEN SECRET: TORTURE AND THE MEDICAL PROFESSION IN
CHILE (1987); GREGG BLOCHE, URUGUAY'S MILITARY PHYSICIANS: COGS IN A
SYSTEM OF STATE TERROR (1987).
3 Rony Brauman, The Medecins sans Frontieres Experience, in Cahill, supra 2, at
ch. 13; see also THE MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES REPORT ON WORLD CRISIS
INTERVENTION, LIFE, DEATH, AND AID (1993); A MEDECINS SANS FRONTIER REPORT,
POPULATIONS IN DANGER (1995).
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matter as a major problem. There are clear guidelines for donations
in kind.3' But donors do not always follow these guidelines, and
stories abound about a Red Cross/Red Crescent society, or a
government, that insisted on providing something inappropriate or
unnecessary. There is infrequent allegation that the ICRC itself called
for inappropriate relief although some believe the ICRC should have
used sorghum rather than rice in Somalia in the early 1990s--so as to
lessen attempted diversions of the much-valued rice.
Finally, a word should be said about mobilizing concern as
well as material and personnel resources. In the 1970s, an
international review team criticized ICRC in a report for being
deficient in openness and public relations. 37 The argument was that
the ICRC had unnecessarily and dysfunctionally emphasized discretion
beyond its detention visits. Thus, Geneva failed to maximize its
support in various circles. Over time the ICRC has greatly expanded
its media and public relations activities, probably for reasons having
more to do with competition from other organizations and a changing
climate of opinion on behalf of humanitarian values than with the
report. Top officials have used the weapon of public protest or
public statement much more frequently than in the past, 38 and without
jeopardizing the victims it seeks to help. The core issue is not public
protest per se, but effective openness at times and in ways to better
mobilize support for humanitarian assistance.
It was only in 1995 that the ICRC opened an office in
Washington. In other ways, the ICRC still found it problematic to
mobilize concern about victims of war and complex emergencies. It
started a relatively candid publication series in French, but refused to
follow through with English translations after a government protested
36 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF RED CROSS RELIEF DIvIsION, HANDBOOK FOR
DONORS: TECHNICAL GUIDELINES FOR DONATIONS IN KIND TO ICRC RELIEF
OPERATIONS (Sept. 1989).
11 DONALD D. TANSLEY, FINAL REPORT: AN AGENDA FOR RED CROSS 22-23, 49, 71,
73, 114-5 (1975).
' See, e.g., A Chain of Change in Gorbachev's Empire, THE ECONOMIST, May 2 1,
1988, at 80.
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some of the contents.39 Parts of the Geneva headquarters would
cooperate with scholars and journalists, but other parts would deny
cooperation on the flimsiest of excuses. Infrequently, other relief
officials found the ICRC difficult to work with, or "prickly" about its
preferred position in relief activity. In the diplomatic phraseology of
two authors, the ICRC was not "an organization to take its special
status lightly."4  These aspects of public relations hampered
mobilization of concern.
Overall, the ICRC record on mobilization of resources,
including concern for victims of war and conflict, is mixed. The ICRC
has helped mobilize important relief in places like Somalia, Bosnia,
and Jordan although it is difficult to specify the exact ICRC role by
comparison with USAID. The ICRC had been slow to fill the need
for international medical relief and to recognize the need for broad
support and cooperation.
V. DELIVERY
Prior to the 1960s, the ICRC had only limited field experience
in delivering relief in armed conflicts. Its relief role in the World Wars
was small relative to overall need and was oriented toward occupied
territory. The ICRC carried out small scale relief in the Middle East
after World War II, but it was only at the time of the Nigerian civil
war (1967-70) that the ICRC began to get into the delivery of food
relief during on-going armed conflict in a sustained and significant
way.4
1
Despite the creation of the UNDHA, presumably to enhance
coordination of relief actors, it remains that in most armed conflicts
aid complex emergencies it is "pluralism run riot."" In the former
'9 MICHELE MERCIER, CRIMES SANS CHATIMENT (1995); Girod, supra note 23.
40 MINEAR & WEISS, supra note 2, at 164.
4' INTERNATIONAL CoMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, THE ROLE OF THE ICRC IN RELIEF
OPERATIONS 1-2 (1994).
42 RANDOLPH C. KENT, ANATOMY OF DISASTER RELIEF: THE INTERNATIONAL
NETWORK IN ACTION 173 (1987).
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Yugoslavia during the early 1990s, there were some 125 NGOs active
in relief, not counting intergovernmental, governmental, and intra-
national or local groups. 43 Insofar as central generalizations can be
drawn from this complexity, it is that frequently the technical or
logistical cooperation among various relief actors is good, but that
coordination of strategy is a different matter.
The ICRC frequently arrives at a division of labor with other
major relief actors such as the UNHCR, UNICEF, World Food
Program, etc. This division of labor pertains to food, water, shelter,
and medical services. In the former Yugoslavia, the UNHCR ran the
largest relief program; the ICRC had the second largest with very little
overlap or confusion between the two. Both were headquartered in
Geneva, both aspired to similar objectives, and each respected the
other. In the Sudan, for much of the 1980s, UNICEF was the lead
UN agency; the ICRC and UNICEF reached agreement on who was
to do what, where. In Rwanda during 1994, the ICRC worked inside
Rwanda, with other groups like Medecins Sans Frontiers, while the
UNHCR and others focused on some two million civilians in need in
Zaire and elsewhere. In Sri Lanka in the 1980s and 1990s, the ICRC
"neutralized" government supplied relief going into the Jaffha
peninsular where a rebel/secessionist movement was entrenched much
of the time. Other actors such as UNHCR, Oxfam, Save the Children,
Medecins Sans Frontier, and local groups all took on other tasks with
little overlap. In Liberia, the ICRC reached agreement both with
UNICEF (which took over an ICRC emergency program for
abandoned children), and the World Food Program (which supplied
food for an ICRC relief action to certain civilians isolated by fighting).
We have already referred to ICRC-UNICEF cooperation in Cambodia
and made passing reference to ICRC-UN cooperation in what became
Bangladesh. According to one informed view, "[T]he last twenty years
have seen considerable improvement in the speed and efficiency of the
humanitarian response to ...crises, showing just how much progress
43 MINAR ET AL., HUMANiTARIAmNAN ACTION, supra note 18, at 40.
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has been made on the technical side.".4
4
It is well and good to say that "when it comes to humanitarian
emergencies there is no room for rivalries and turf fights. "'n But
competition does occur, and we have already referred to the ICRC
and Joint Church Aid in Nigeria, the ICRC and the Red Cross
Federation in Ethiopia, and the ICRC and other medical groups such
as Medecins Sans Frontier. Private relief groups compete for "market
share," and want to establish independent credit if only for purposes
of future fund raising. The various UN agencies also seek
independent reputation, in part because they depend on select and
voluntary contributions from donors like the U.S. The leading policy-
makers of relief agencies may seek independence in the quest for
personal recognition. Some actors are more solicitous than others of
international norms, whether legal or otherwise. Some actors rely
more than others on public protest about wrongdoing. Some relief
actors believe they should use their presence to contribute to criminal
prosecutions; the ICRC disagrees. The complexity of situations, as in
Ethiopia in the 1970s and 1980s, or Zaire in the 1990s, guarantees a
variety of viewpoints among relief actors about the wisdom of any one
policy.
46
Because the ICRC has a mandate that includes prisoner
matters, and because the ICRC will sometimes take on special tasks,
its decisions about assistance may be affected. It is highly likely that
its decisions about relief in greater Ethiopia were affected to some
degree by its quest for visits to detained fighters. It is possible that
Geneva used assistance as "bait" or "carrot" in that situation for access
to detainees. In Mexico in the 1990s, ICRC decisions to provide relief
in the province of Chiappas seemed to be linked to broader concerns
11 TANSLEY, supra note 36, at 13.
45 Jan Eliasson, quoted in ERSKINE CHILDERS & BRIAN URQUHART, RENEWING THE
UNIrED NATIONS SYSTEM 255 (1994).
46 After the Rwandan mass exodus in 1994, various relief agencies disagreed about
whether to provide food to refugee camps in which militias operated. The UNHCR
continued with food deliveries, but MSF stopped its medical work, believing it was
contributing to a resumption of fighting in the future.
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regarding prisoner and other matters requiring a neutral
intermediary.47
The ICRC makes an independent judgment about when the
security situation requires a suspension of activity. It stayed in
Somalia long after most UN personnel were withdrawn. But it has
suspended relief for security reasons, as in Bosnia and Liberia in the
early 1990s. Between 1988 and early 1994, 18 persons working in
ICRC delegations were held hostage for varying lengths of time, and
another eight were killed in various ways.48
The ICRC tries to provide basic or emergency relief only, with
some transition to more developmental -- or emergency rehabilitation
relief On occasion it provides seed, farming tools, fishing equipment,
etc. so that persons can provide for themselves after the core
emergency has passed. The ICRC has also carried out cattle
vaccination programs, because of concern for self-sufficiency. The
agency seeks to avoid prolonged dependency on its relief But there
is debate in Geneva about emphasis on emergency relief with little
developmental assistance -- a situation that can lead to reoccurring
crises.
The agency complies with UN stipulations regarding
embargoes, even when Geneva believes the UN is in error. Thus
when the UN Security Council imposed comprehensive sanctions on
Iraq in the 1990s, the ICRC did not try to break sanctions even when
it thought the UN sanctions policy too harsh on vulnerable groups of
the Iraqi civilian population.
Overall, the ICRC has earned a reputation for delivering rapid
and effective relief, particularly on a small to medium scale. It can act
in a timely manner, being much smaller and more flexible than UN
agencies, and having personnel already in many regions on the world.
It is particularly well known for logistical efficiency and for the
discipline and commitment of its personnel.49
" Beatrice Megevand, INT'LREV. RED CROSS No. 304, BETWEEN INSURRECTION AND
GOVERNMENT, Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 94-108.
4 THE RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT, Jan.-Apr. 1994, at 21.
4 NATsIos, supra note 2, at 73-74.
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VI. EVALUATION AND PLANNING
The ICRC, seeing itself as the guardian of international
humanitarian law, tries to systematically translate its practical
experience into principles of humanitarian action. Thus, it now
reviews it own policies, proposes resolutions for the International Red
Cross/Red Crescent Conference to adopt, and proposes international
legal standards for state consent. The fourth Geneva Convention of
1949 was in part the result of the ICRC's difficulties concerning
civilian assistance and protection during the preceding world war.
Before the Nigerian war, however, the ICRC was not
altogether given to careful evaluation and planning. During World
War II, top ICRC policy makers met in Geneva spasmodically in a
non-rigorous and not fully systematic process. They had inadequate
sources of information needed for sharp decisions about assistance
and detention visits. Some key players were ultra-cautious and
legalistic. They were pressured by Swiss governmental authorities not
to be too tough vis-a-vis Nazi Germany, in the interests of the
neutrality and independence of the Swiss state. Moreover, ICRC
policy makers failed to control the use of Red Cross travel documents,
which were used by some in the Italian Red Cross to facilitate the
passage to South America of a number of European officials
responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes
against peace. While true that many ICRC delegates performed with
superb skill in the face of great danger during World War II, for
example, in German concentration camps toward the close of the war,
the overall ICRC record on policy planning for that era leaves
something to be desired.5"
Immediately after the Nigerian civil war, when former high
50 JEAN-CLAUDE FAVEZ, UNE MISSION IMPOSSIBLE?: LE CICR, LES DEPORTATIONS,
ET LES CAMPS DE CONCENTRATIONS NAZIS (1988); DRAGO ARSENIJEVIC, OTAGES
VOLONTAIRES DES SS (1984); ARiEH BEN-ToY, FACING THE HOLOCAUST IN BUDAPEST
(1988).
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ICRC officials hammered home the point about lack of carefully
planned policies,5' important changes occurred in Geneva.52 The
agency put more day-to-day policy in the hands of professional staff,
improved the training of delegates, reconsidered the role of the
volunteer Assembly, and in general became a more reflective and
professional humanitarian actor. Unlike some actors that spring up
overnight for particular crises, or that launch into action with an
abundance of moral fervor but without careful reflection, the ICRC
increasingly tried to bring its institutional memory to bear on current
and future issues pertaining to humanitarian assistance.
The ICRC was part of an effort throughout the Red Cross/Red
Crescent Movement to produce "national vulnerability assessments"
by national societies in anticipation of problems. The ICRC interacted
with various other actors to help produce codes of conduct for
humanitarian actors and of drafts of a clarified right to humanitarian
assistance.53 In various ways the ICRC was a key player as the
international community stumbled toward planning for an improved
relief system for wars and similar events at the turn of the century.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The ICRC is not the relief actor for international humanitarian
assistance in armed conflict and civil strife. The global challenge is
too great and the ICRC is too small. Some crises are so massive that
only states and their military establishments can provide the necessary
resources and logistics--and at times security. There is growing
demand for sound public policy and management of humanitarian
assistance. The ICRC remains a private Swiss agency, although
recognized in public international law, which answers to no one but
itself--at least formally speaking. Western governments provide most
51 JACQUES FREYMOND, GUERRES, REVOLUTIONS, CROIX-ROUGE (1976). Freymond
was a former Vice President and acting president of the ICRC.
32 VICHNIAC, supra note 4 (capturing some of the changes).
3 INT'L REV. RED CRoss, No. 297, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON THE RIGHT TO
HuMAmITARIAN AssisTANcE, Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 519-525.
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of the ICRC budgets, and thus the agency must be sensitive to their
concerns. Just as the ICRC failed to dominate the evolution of the
Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, with symbols and actors coming
into existence that weakened the unity of the Movement, so the ICRC
failed to dominate relief in armed conflict and complex emergencies.
Whether it could have been otherwise I leave to the historians. 54
Changes occurred after the Nigerian war that made the ICRC
one of the more respected and effective providers of assistance in
conflict situations. Mohamed Sahnoun, an Algerian diplomat who
was the representative of the UN Secretary-General in Somalia, and
who was not hesitant to criticize malfeasance, identified the ICRC as
one of two agencies (UNICEF was the other) which had made a
"sterling contribution" in the extremely difficult circumstances of that
failed state during the 1990s." Larry Minear, who was part of a
major study of humanitarian assistance conducted via Brown
University, concluded that "The ICRC has the most consistent record
of functioning well under duress" in conflict situations.56 The late
Fred Cuny, a widely respected expert on disaster assistance, also
praised the ICRC, although he thought the agency's penchant for
secrecy would keep it from playing a wide role in most conflict
situations." James Ingram, with long experience in international food
"' The group that became the ICRC initially held the view that it should not be an
operational actor for assistance and detention visits but should be a stimulus for the
national societies, who could act with impartiality and neutrality. After the First World
War, when this vision largely collapsed, the League, now Federation, of Red Cross
Societies, and powerful national societies, went their own ways, and the Movement
was fractured. See also BOUGNION, supra note 5; see also HurCHINSON, supra note
4.
" MOHAMED SAHNOUN, SOMALIA: THE MISSED OPPORTUITIES 18 (1994).
Furthermore, his comment laying blame on "an overwhelming United Nations
bureaucracy that, in contrast to the Red Cross, is made up of civil servants more
interested in careers and prerequisites than in the job at hand." John Perlez, No Easy
Fixfor Somalia," N.Y. TIMES, Sept.7, 1992, A l.
56 Larry Minear, Making the Humanitarian System Work Better, in CAHILL, supra
note 2, at 243.
" Fred Cuny, Humanitatian Assistance in the Post-Cold War Era, WEISS & MINEAR
in supra note 2, at 168.
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efforts, commented that "The bravery and competence of ICRC staff
are beyond reproach and have aroused great admiration.""8
One can conceive of certain scenarios that would reduce the
role of the ICRC as coordinator of Red Cross relief in conflict
situations. The UNDHA might be given real authority to coordinate
the UN agencies active in relief, although this seems unlikely at the
time of writing. Conversely, the UNDHA might be dissolved, and an
improved UN disaster agency created, perhaps on the back of the UN
Development Program. This also seems unlikely. A third possibility
is that the major donors, USAID and the EU's ECHO, by the power
of their coontributions and related logistics capability, might
themselves insist on the creation of a more effective system from the
existing actors. Since the ICRC resists this type of vertical
coordination by public/political bodies, it might be left mostly on the
sidelines with only the roles of advance warning and small scale
temporary relief.
To the extent that the current system of international
humanitarian assistance continues, the ICRC is likely to remain one of
the more important actors. It has performed the various tasks inherent
in assistance reasonably well. It endorses horizontal or voluntary
coordination among relief actors, and the current system performs
better than one might expect from an initial look at its complexity.
The ICRC has not been marginalized in the provision of
humanitarian assistance by the proliferation of other actors. The
agency has found various important roles for itself, with donor
support, that varies from case to case. In 1992 it delivered more
assistance than in any year since World War II, with 70% of it going
to Somalia and former Yugoslavia.59 The ICRC, like other relief
actors, has been marginalized in some conflicts at some times by the
fighting parties themselves. That the ICRC was kept from providing
the assistance it wanted in places like Liberia or the Sudan was not the
fault of the agency, but of the inhumane values of the combatants.
S James Ingram, The Future Architecture for International Humanitarian
Assistance, in WEIss & MINEAR, supra note 2, at 189 and passim.
9 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTE OF THE RED CROSS, ANNUAL REPORT 1992,3 (1993).
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That ICRC safe areas for civilian protection and assistance in Liberia
worked no better than UN protected areas in Bosnia, and that the
ICRC had to withdraw from Liberia for a time, reflected badly on the
fighting parties but not on Geneva.
Unfortunately, the near future holds more of the same, with
perhaps increased horizontal coordination among those who provide
humanitarian assistance in armed conflict and civil strife. The ICRC,
given its history and linkage to international humanitarian law,
believes it is obligated to stay the course and do the best it can.
